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4th of July HAPPY INDEPENDENCE DAY Fireworks


A Company Commander's
Thoughts on Iraq
by Captain John B. Nails

This article shares some of my experiences in Iraq that will help prepare
commanders and platoon leaders on what to expect and how to better prepare
soldiers for the tasks ahead. These tasks are not covered by a supplement or
manual, and are not a joy to learn in midst of a firefight. I know there are
more than a hundred correct responses to every issue. These opinions are
based on my experiences as a tank and headquarters company commander in an
armor battalion preparing for and executing combat operations in a stability
and support environment.

Before Deployment 

Equip all of your soldiers, even the diehard "death before dismount" tanker
noncommissioned officers, with either M4s or M16s. Also, the headquarters
and headquarters company commander, the battalion commander, XO, S3, and
staff will want M16s/M4s. An M9 makes a nice decoration, but is not worth
spit in a firefight. The folks who think differently usually learn the hard
way - after their first engagement. You do not want the "old man" to take
his driver's rifle during a raid, as I have seen happen.

Get dismount kits for your M240Bs. You will need crew served weapons; all
you can muster. Determine ways to mount M240s and M2 .50 calibers on your
trucks - all your trucks. Get the parts to turn your M1A1 tank version .50
cals into flexes - you will need the flexes in your trucks. I'm a nice guy,
but when I go home, I'm taking my .50s with me, as my unit is M1A2SEP
equipped, and the flex .50 is our baby. The good news is most of the
up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) come with
.50s. However, due to the limited number available for the task force, you
will want crew served weapons on everything. Train your drivers to drive
with no lights - not even blackout markers. The noncompliant forces (NCF)
will track your movements by your blackout lights. They have plenty of
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) to launch. Do not be a target. Expect
mounted patrols from a mismatch of different HMMWVs. The parade-ground,
pretty-boy type will really hate what we are doing to trucks in Iraq, as
they look like something out of a Mad Max movie. But nothing is worth the
price of losing a soldier, if we know we can prevent it.

Prepare your HMMWVs at home station. Most of us have removed the doors from
our trucks to increase our fields of fire when returning fire. Canvas doors
offer no protection and only serve to reduce your fields of fire while on
the move. Order Kevlar blankets and purchase infrared lights and mount them
on your trucks. Sandbag everything. Either fabricate or order mounts for
crew served weapons for every HMMWV, take them to a range and have them fire
stationary and on the move, both during daylight and darkness. Have the tank
commander fire his M16 from a moving truck while seated.

While in Iraq, your convoy will get ambushed. I know all the range control
geeks are going to have a heart attack when you make this suggestion. Any
one of them is welcome to ride a patrol with me in Iraq. This is what we do,
and what we should train. Experiencing an ambush for the first time is
unpleasant, especially while a hail of RPG and small-arms fire rains down
from multiple directions.

Train as many combat lifesavers (CLS) as you can. Order the correct number
of CLS bags needed - not what is indicated on the MTOE. Several companies
sell stocked CLS bags for about 25 dollars. Most of these companies accept
government credit cards. The budget geek who tells you it is too expensive
needs to be around when the frantic scramble for the CLS bag occurs. He
would only have to witness it once in his career for him to get the point.
Since there are no rear areas over here, he just might.

Train your soldiers - all of them, even the cooks, clerks, and command
drivers, on dismounted operations. Teach dismounted patrol, ambush, and
counter-ambush techniques. Tankers, scouts, mortarmen, you will need to do
this. Teach everyone how to react to ambushes - mounted and dismounted. You
cannot take your tanks and personnel carriers everywhere.

Teach your soldiers how to clear houses. Set inner and outer cordons, and
designate search teams to enter houses. Develop your techniques before you
go to Iraq. Beat up your boss so you can train with tactical human
intelligence teams and tactical psychological operations teams before you
deploy. I know this will be difficult because most of these units are either
Army Reserve or National Guard. These soldiers can keep crowds back with
their speakers, and their translators will help you sort out good guys from
bad guys. They can identify the difference between deeds to homes and
instruction manuals for mortars. Unless you can read and write Arabic, you
are just plain out of luck.

Train your first sergeants how to process detainees. Have military police
and military intelligence soldiers teach you how to do the paperwork
correctly, to include witness statements. If the paperwork is incomplete,
really bad people end up getting released. Do not get frustrated if you have
to redo a form. Getting the yardbird orchestrating attacks off the street is
far more important to the lives of your soldiers than a little wounded pride
over a screwed up form.

Get your mind right. You will be in firefights. Your tankers will dismount.
Mentally prepare your families and your soldiers for what lies ahead.
Commander, you will take casualties. Make sure your supply sergeant knows
how to inventory and ship personal effects. Ensure your soldiers' deployment
readiness is tight, to include NCOs getting involved with soldiers'
finances. If one of your soldiers is having marriage difficulties now, you
can bet they are not going to get any better during a yearlong deployment.

Prepare your soldiers to deal with wounded and dead Americans and Iraqis.
You will see and treat them. Tell your medics up front they cannot save
every life - people will die. An intravenous infusion and a few bandages
will not save a man whose lungs are shredded by a 5.56 round, even if the
guy was shot on the operating table at the combat support hospital.

Tell family support groups what to expect. Do not sugarcoat the message. If
you do, spouses will think they have been lied to, and you will lose their
trust. Tell the spouses the truth; hold back nothing. For example,
Specialist Jones cannot come home because granddad passed away, the family
has financial problems, or the first baby is born. Ensure your soldier's
family members know how to contact the American Red Cross in the event of a
family disaster. Your family support group leader must be willing to contact
family members for all your soldiers, not just the married ones. Know your
soldiers' family support group contact and keep the rosters tight. Mom and
Dad want to know how Johnnie is doing just as badly as a husband, wife, or
fiance. Get accurate contact information from spouses who return home for
the deployment duration.

While In Iraq: What to Expect and a Couple of Recommendations

Not all of Iraq is a big desert. The river valleys are loaded with date palm
groves, vineyards, and sunflower fields. The ground is covered in
waist- to chest-high grass. Vegetation is very thick. The roads are elevated
from the fields, and are usually bordered by walls, fences, or canals, which
cross the landscape in all directions of the compass. Most groves are
separated into 5- to 10-acre plots surrounded by walls or fences. The walls
and fences provide good cover and make great obstacles, as do the canals.
Most canal bridges will not support a tank's weight.

The towns and villages have narrow streets; more narrow than
Europe.Electrical wires hang about 8 to 10 feet off the ground and cross
each other in no particular pattern. Running an M1 tank through these areas
is possible, but due to the amount of collateral damage, it would be unwise.
Remember, we are restoring the Iraqi infrastructure, not destroying it. Most
buildings are made of bricks and concrete, while others are made of
adobe-style mud. 

Key leaders (platoon sergeants and up) need to carry a couple of body bags
and sets of rubber gloves. Initially, my battalion chain of command felt it
was counterproductive to morale. What was actually counterproductive to
morale was the pieces of human remains my soldiers had to pick up and place
on a litter and cover with a blanket because nothing else was available.
Remember, not all casualties will be Americans. We are a civilized nation,
and we recover the remains of our enemies and civilians as well.

Expect combat stress and have your chaplain and medics locate and tie into
your servicing combat stress teams. Have the combat stress teams pay
periodic visits to your soldiers. It will pay off in the long run. Let your
soldiers know that the effect of combat stress makes you no less a man.

Think before you announce, "on the way" with a high-explosive antitank
round. The NCFs will fire at you from or near occupied homes. Once the sun
comes up, you will see several small children emerge from these homes.
Imagine if you would have let go with your big gun. How many deaf children
on the block did you create? How will this impact community relations? Use
appropriate force. Yes, there are times to let loose the big bullets, and I
am more willing to let one fly than most, but make sure it is an informed
decision, and a price you are willing to pay.

A Trip Down Canal Road

The B Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment commander and I planned a
simple night operation to engage and destroy a few NCFs along a specific
narrow road where our elements were ambushed in the past. Our combined team
consisted of two M1064 mortar tracks, two M1A2SEP tanks, three up-armored
HMMWVs, and my M1025 scout HMMWV. The HMMWV's and personnel carriers were
armed with .50 cals. We had two Kiowa Warrior helicopters from E Troop, 1st
Squadron, 10th Cavalry in support. Our battalion S2 and S3 joined our
mission. 

Our plan was to conduct a presence patrol through the town of Al Abbarah,
and split into two separate groups of one tank, one M1064, and two HMMWVs to
cover two additional villages along the Dyalia River Valley. Once we reached
a designated point, we would turn around and head back the way we came and
linkup for the trip through the hotspot near Al Abbarah. During the time
when our forces were split, we had 2 kilometers between us.

Varying routes is a very important thing to do; however, in this particular
area, there is only one bridge that can support the weight of tanks and we
were restricted to using the same route in and out. The Kiowas provided
route reconnaissance for our move into and out of the river valley, thus
mitigating the tactical risk of using the same ingress and egress routes. Or
so we thought. 

The move in went on schedule, the tanks, personnel carriers, and HMMWVs
rolling along smoothly while the Kiowas, who dropped to our company
frequency, flew ahead observing anything unusual. We split from each other,
turned around at the appropriate point, and linked back up on schedule.
Negative contact. We held our move back through Al Abbarah for 15 minutes to
allow the Kiowas to observe any NCFs attempting to set a trap for us on the
way back through, thus allowing us to ambush those who were trying to ambush
us. Easy 14 and Easy 16, the Kiowa pilots, spotted nothing through the thick
canopy of date palms, and no activity along the roadways on either side of
the canal. We started our move back, the Kiowas with us the entire way.

The ambush was initiated by seven 152mm artillery rounds hidden in the weeds
on the shoulder of the roadway that paralleled the canal. They were
daisy-chained together. The lead tank absorbed the bulk of the blast,
shrapnel cutting through the main gun tube in several locations. The blast
created a debris field of dust and asphalt, denser than any smoke screen I
have ever seen. The truck in front of me stalled in the debris field. To my
rear, one of my mortar tracks engulfed the narrow roadway. Then the
small-arms fire started. We could not go forward or backward. We were in the
kill zone, unable to move. Tracers flew over, under, in front of, and behind
my truck. Every soldier in my truck returned fire. My supply clerk and
.50-cal gunner laid down blistering fire, as the rest of us fired our M16s
out the windows; aiming at the muzzle flashes from both sides of the road.

There is a time when training takes over your actions, and this was one of
those times, which is why it is so important to train to standard all the
time. I counted six separate muzzle flashes from the left side of the road,
and four separate muzzle flashes from the right side of the road. With my
magazine empty, I grabbed a fresh one and seated it firmly. An RPG flew over
top. I shot at muzzle flashes until they stopped blinking. Then, as abruptly
as it started, it stopped. The firefight lasted about 45 seconds: it was the
longest 45 seconds of my life.

Grabbing the hand mike while yelling for a crew report, I learned that our
S3 was wounded. I fed reports to the tactical operations center (TOC) while
our team split into two separate columns. The wheels and the personnel
carriers raced to the brigade aid station, and the tanks turned around at
our rally point and moved in to secure the ambush site. Easy 14 and 16
responded to the ambush site with 14 rockets, once we were clear. I believe
it was their rocket run that settled the hash of the NCFs for the remainder
of the night. 

The tank commander on B22 knew something was wrong. His tank lost turret
power, so he lost the thermal imagery and the commander's independent
thermal viewer. Still, he did not hesitate to move back in and secure the
ambush site. He requested artillery illumination to aid observation. I will
never forget his words over the net when he was told his request was
denied: 
"Illumination denied. I've lost turret power; I have my nods and my .50.
Hooah. I will stay until relieved. White 2 out."

Our battalion quick reaction force relieved the crew on B22 a couple of
hours later. The rest of the patrol drove back to our forward operating
base. The B Company commander and I reported to the battalion TOC and
debriefed the battle captain and the battlefield information center. I
volunteered to take the battalion XO out to the ambush site at first light.
We were fortunate to only suffer one casualty, as the following day we
learned several things about the techniques used by our enemies.

We discovered only four of the seven daisy-chained artillery rounds
detonated. God was with me - my truck was beside one of the rounds that did
not explode. My scout platoon found detonation wire and traced it back along
a wall between two fields, out of sight from the road. We found a stake and
a screwdriver. The device was most likely fired by a car battery, and the
screwdriver was used to complete the circuit. From the position of the
individual who initiated the blast, he must have been in communication with
a cohort who had direct observation of the roadway, because he was unable to
observe the roadway from his position.

On the left side of the road, the NCFs used a cinderblock wall for cover,
and the canal as an obstacle. From the right side of the road, they used
climbing rigs (used for harvesting dates) to shimmy up palm trees and engage
us with direct fire, using a wire fence and depression as an obstacle. Once
return fire became too hot, they dropped from the trees and fled through the
groves, which have a floor 8 to 10 feet lower than the roadbed. Our rounds
passed harmlessly over their heads.

We discovered a small cache of hand grenades, RPG projectiles, and explosive
materials. We pieced together the daisy-chained artillery rounds that
initiated the ambush and the RPG launch that signaled break contact. We
questioned the local populace and found them all to be very upset by the
massive amounts of fire power displayed a few hours earlier, but claimed
ignorance as to who planted the improvised explosive device (IED) and who
was responsible for the ambush.

We learned a few days later that, shortly after we departed the area, a
funeral was held. We were unable to determine how many had "died" the day or
evening prior, or from what cause. A funeral may be for one or many. The
local populace tends to keep to themselves; as during the Baath party rule,
it was better to be ignorant of what your neighbor was doing for reasons of
self-preservation. 

One of our challenges is to teach the Iraqi people not to fear the truth of
any situation. Thirty-five years of living under a ruthless dictator whose
retributions were swift and terrible will take a long time to flush out.

Conclusively, I offer a few recommendations based on my limited experiences
and observations. In no way does this apply to the whole of Iraq, as each
area has its own particularities. Train - both physically and mentally - for
what lies ahead. Learn tactics, techniques, and procedures during your
upcoming leader recons. During transfer of authority, talk to those of us
who are here, experiencing it now. Bring fresh ideas into the fight. Learn
from us. We have knocked our unconventional enemies back on their heels,
when it's your turn to jump into the ring, may you deliver the knockout
blow. 

CPT John B. Nails is commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 3d
Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX,
currently in Ba'Qubah, Iraq. He is a graduate of Old Dominion University.
His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer
Advanced Course, the Armor Captains Career Course, and the Combined Arms and
Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions,
to include platoon leader and company executive officer with 1st Battalion,
63d Armor, 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany; and brigade
planner, 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX.

Armor 
Volume 113, Issue 1
February 2004
Page: 13-16

This Document is in the public domain and may be reproduced in whole or in
part. 








 






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