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4th of July HAPPY INDEPENDENCE DAY Fireworks


Operation Anaconda
USAFSO Tactical Air Control Party
Member's Personal Experience

  
I entered into the USAF eleven days after graduating 
from high school. I went to open general basic training. 
I was not sure which career path to take until I was 
asked to try out to be a tactical air control party
from a TACP recruiter.  I was one of the few who tried 
out and was chosen.  I went to technical school in Florida 
for fourteen weeks. My first assignment was at Ft. Polk in 
Louisiana supporting the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment for 
three years. I then transferred to support the Joint 
Readiness Training Center for a year. Next, I was assigned
to Camp Casey in Korea for one year. Afterwards, I tried
out for and was selected for my present job.  I have been 
with my current unit for two and a half years.  I have had 
basic training, TACP training, Ranger School, Basic Airborne 
School, Air Assault School, HALO School, and Pathfinder School.
At around 0115z on 4 March 2002, I was told that a military 
member was on the ground in a hostile area in Afghanistan after 
falling out of a helicopter.  My team was told that another 
team was attempting to go in and get him, but if they were 
not successful, my team would go in.  We were waiting to find 
out if we would go in to try to get to our lost military member.  
My team was in a helicopter in route and our estimated time of 
arrival was 0150z.  My team consisted of ten people plus three
special tactics squadron members [STS] and we were with eight
crewmembers, a total of twenty-one personnel. At 0140z I had 
noticed we were flying in circles around the mountaintop 
because I had noticed the same terrain twice. As we  were 
circling about the third time, we were hit with a 
rocket-propelled grenade  around 0145z.  There were sparks on 
the right side of the aircraft and we started to shake violently.  
Then our helicopter just fell out of the sky about 15 feet to 
the ground.  After the first RPG hit us to when the helicopter 
hit the ground, I do not remember specifics of what happened,
it was a blur.  No one, to my knowledge, was injured from the 
initial crash.Before I could get off the aircraft, another RPG 
hit the aircraft where the right door gunner was. There was 
only one military member between the right door gunner and 
myself. I am not positive how many times our helicopter was 
shot but I think altogether, four RPGs were shot at us. I was 
snap linked into the helicopter, a precaution so we do not 
fall out of the helicopter.  First I was trying to get my 
snap link/safety line off but the pararescueman [PJ] behind 
me was pushing me so it pulled tight. I had a little bit of 
trouble getting it off; it slowed me down about 15 seconds.  
I then ran off the back of the aircraft. By the time I was 
able to get off of the aircraft, three of our team members 
were already dead.  One team member was on the ramp with a 
hole in his head.  There was no mistaking that he was dead.  
The second team member was at the end of the ramp face down 
in the snow. His position was such that if there had been 
life left in him, he would have moved his head out of the 
snow. I later found out that he had been shot under the arm 
though his chest and out his above right nipple. The last 
deceased team member was lying on his back at the end of 
the ramp not moving. These three deceased members survived 
the initial crash without injury, but had died from enemy 
fire. I knew we had three killed in action, which left 
seven of our team, three of which were injured. I had 
shrapnel in the arm, but did not notice it until later.  
My platoon leader had shrapnel in his leg, it was a pretty 
good chunk, and another team member had shrapnel in his 
lower left calf and was moving slow.  Our team knew how to 
fight and how to operate on the ground. The aircrew did not 
have the same training. I exited the aircraft and threw my 
rucksack off but kept it within 20 meters from me.  I 
figured out which way we were being engaged from and I 
sought cover behind a cut out in the rock face.  It was just 
big enough for four team members to kneel behind it.  We set 
up a perimeter.  Two other members were back to my right and 
three members to my left. I was closest to the enemy. There 
were two enemies about 50 meters north of us near a tree.  
There was one enemy behind me and to the right already dead.  
There were some more enemies to the south coming out. Then we 
started to engage the enemy. I was shooting an M4. At first, 
my priority was to keep engaging the enemy to hold them back 
and then to seek assistance for close air support on the radio.  
My radio, a PRC 117F, was still in my rucksack. There was a
combat controller, who was behind me a bit. I turned around 
and yelled at him to work on getting communications running, 
he already was working on it. I decided that I needed to be 
on the line fighting, if I had been on the radio, then the 
combat controller would have been sitting there doing nothing 
because he doesn't have the assault training.  I decided that 
he should call in the CAS as I directed him. I told him my 
rucksack had a radio in it. A member of the crew dragged my 
rucksack to the CCT so he had my radio. First, we shot M203 
rounds at a bunker. A M203 is a grenade launcher that fits on 
a M4/16. As the squad leader and team leader shot M203s, I 
stood up and provided covering fire.  When he would stand up 
to fire a grenade at the bunker, I would standup and shoot 
at the bunker to cover him. I did the same when the crew-
members would run for more ammo. We tried throwing fragment 
grenades at the enemy but it they were too far away and the 
bunker was on the backside of the hill.  The enemy threw
fragment grenades at us but they landed 5-10 feet in front 
of me, buried in the snow and blew up. I believe one of the 
helicopter pilots was dead and the other was injured severely.  
The other pilot opened the door to the aircraft and fell out 
of the aircraft face first. He lay there in the snow securing
his area.  There was no power to the aircraft without which 
we could not operate the mini-guns. One of the team members 
yelled at a member of the crew to get the power working so 
we could use those guns. The mini-guns shoot 7.62 ammo and 
so does our M240.  The crew was taking ammo and giving it to 
our M240 gunner.  When the crewmembers would run back to the 
aircraft for more ammo, I would standup and shoot at the bunker 
to cover them. They were also taking M203 rounds and magazines
off of the KIA and bringing it to us. The crew pulled off 
insulation from the aircraft to wrap the casualties in to keep 
them warm. Then four of us (myself, the platoon leader, squad 
leader, and team leader) started to assault the tree area where 
the enemy was coming from while the M240 gunner suppressed it.  
Once we realized that it was a bunker, a couple of enemy came 
out from behind a tree and took shots at us.  We were moving 
slow because the snow was up to our knees and we were going 
uphill.  The platoon leader finally said let's back up and 
rethink this.  We backed up because we could not afford to 
lose any more guys. The combat controller yelled that we have 
F-15s on station. The Platoon Leader was next to me and we 
discussed it. Then F-15s were overhead and the combat 
controller was directing them to the enemy according to my
instructions. I told the combat controller to have the F-15s 
to strafe the bunker and have them come in from our right to 
our left. The CCT repeated what I said.  He was smart enough 
that I did not have to tell him too much detail of what to say 
on the radio. We used the position of the helicopter to give 
clock directions. He had basic knowledge of CAS so I could tell 
him to have the fighters do gun runs on an area from which 
direction and he would get on the radio and make it happen. The
first F-15 pass was really close and I was uncomfortable because 
I could not tell if the guns were pointing at my team or the 
enemy bunker so I told the CCT to abort it. I told him to have 
them come in more from behind us, so I could tell they were not 
pointing at us. I told him to clear them and the rounds hit right 
by the bunker. I told him to have them do that over and over again.  
I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s and F-16s. For the 
first 10-15 minutes, the CCT thought I was the team leader.  He 
yelled to me 'team leader' when the team leader was sitting next 
to him. At this point, the team member who was injured in the leg 
and could not move easily was facing one way. Another Sgt. and I 
were pulling security on the bunker. The Patoon Leader and I 
tried to determine where would be a good landing zone. The fighters 
did some more gun runs and the enemy was still jumping up shooting 
at us. The enemy was moving on us from behind us (we didn't know 
this at the time) but the majority of enemy were firing at us were
on the hill near the bunker area. We killed seven of them. The last
time I saw anyone move in the bunker, I was scanning the hilltop 
and I saw the upper half of an enemy behind some bushes. I shot 
three times, got down and stood back up. This was the last I had 
seen him. I never went over towards that bunker so I cannot confirm 
if I had killed him. Then we shot some more bombs in the bunker area.  
I told CCT to direct them to shoot down the backside of the hill 
north of us. I thought it was better to have them shoot downhill 
with the first one so we could walk him in to the target. The first 
bomb hit the backside of the hill and then I told him to bring it up 
and hit the tree over the bunker. The second one hit the tree dead on 
and split it in half.  The fire from the bunker area ceased. We could 
not see over the hill and did not know what was over there.  CCT said 
we have some 500-pound bombs to use. After discussing with the PL, I 
said let's drop them on the backside of the hill and walk them up.  
They were dropping them about 75 to 100 meters away from us. Some of 
the pilots did not want to drop them without the commander's initials 
because they were afraid they would kill us. At that point we were not 
taking any more fire from the top of the hill so the platoon leader 
wanted to wait until our reinforcements linked up with us before we 
tried moving on the top of the hill. By this time, the second 
helicopter landed at the bottom of the hill to our northeast and 
reinforcements were moving towards us. The second aircraft had ten 
team members on it. They moved uphill to us. This was about two and 
a half hours after we had crashed. On the way, they were taking some 
mortar fire. At one point they had bracketed us with the mortars but 
then they started shooting mortars down the hill to try and hit the 
second team members as they were coming up the hill to reinforce us.  
I do not know where the enemies were shooting the mortars from. Later, 
I learned they were being shot from a position about 300 meters from 
us on the backside of the hill. Finally, our reinforcements linked
up with us. A 500-pound bomb hit just over the backside of the hilltop.  
It hit at an angle where it blew everything back over the top of us so 
it was raining debris and metal pieces down around us.  That was the 
only point where we were really concerned with our safety from the 
friendly bombs. This was the last time we used the 500-pound bombs. 
Together we started to take the top of the hill. Once we took the top 
of the hill we found two more friendly bodies. They included the member 
who fell out of the helicopter that we were there to find and a member 
from the team before us that tried to go in to get him.  We were sent 
in because they were not successful. Both members had been shot and 
killed. We had thirty-three members on the hill (including two 
deceased we found), sixteen were fighting, and three of those sixteen 
were wounded. The other half was working on casualties or were 
casualties themselves. As we took the top of the hill, we started 
taking fire from behind us. We had to turn around and fight the other 
way. Meanwhile, all of our casualties were lying out in the open down 
the hill. Once taking fire from the other direction, we had to go
downhill to get our casualties.  The casualties were the first three
team members out of the aircraft and the pilot.  A PJ, and another 
team member were killed from gunfire as they were going down to get 
the casualties. At this point, I was still on the top of the hill 
sitting next to the CCT and the PL while talking on the radio. I was 
reporting back to higher and CCT was talking to the aircraft. We were 
the command and control section. I could have taken the radio back 
from CCT and said that it is my job to call in CAS, but he had been 
working with them already and understood the landmarks, he was talking 
about. If I had to do it, then it would have been a relearning process 
so I continued to monitor him and let him call in CAS.  The medics kept 
the PJ alive for about 10 hours (about an hour and half before we got 
exfiltrated). I reported it to the Controller when he died. They also 
dropped 1000 pounders that landed 150 meters away from us. That was a 
little close and I made sure the CCT had them push those out a bit. It 
hit the nearside of the hill instead of the far side and shook the team 
members up. No one was injured. When the bomb hit, some debris on fire 
flew up into the air about 75 feet over our heads and continued on into 
the valley where it caught something on fire in the valley. After being 
on the ground for about three hours, we had to move the bodies up the 
mountain before we could be exfiltrated. This would have taken about one 
half hour. Controller asked me if the pick-up zone was cold and how many 
guys we were going to lose if we waited to be exfiltrated. I asked the 
medic 'if we hang out here, how many guys are going to die?"  The medic 
said at least two, maybe three. I reported to Controller 'it is a cold 
PZ and we are going to lose three if we wait. Just as I said it was a 
cold PZ, we were shot at. However, we could have made it cold by the 
time they got the helicopters in there. It was just every once and while 
the enemy would take pop shots at us. If we had CAS on station dropping 
bombs, we could have gotten out of there at that time. I told CCT to 
drop bombs down in the valley and on the small hill every now and again.  
Every time the plane showed up and you could hear them, we weren't being 
shot at. Just having the planes nearby kept the enemy away. Continuously 
dropping bombs discouraged them from coming after us. So every now and 
again, we would drop bombs on them with B52s, B-1s, those were the last 
aircraft we had. I cannot remember which one. I was watching our medic, 
he was a part of the second team, as he was working on the PJ.  I saw 
him doing CPR on the PJ and I knew it was bad. I then saw the medic 
stand up, look over at me, and start walking to me. That is when I got 
on the radio to Controller and told him that we now have seven KIA.  
The whole fifteen and one half hours we were on the ground I was
fighting, talking on the radio, or telling the CCT what to call in. I 
shot a total of 420 rounds during the fifteen and one half hours. I was 
on the C2 line the whole time while watching over CCT's shoulder to make
sure everything was all right.  As the hostile fire started slowing
down, I barely had to tell CCT what to do, just drop bombs over here 
or over there. I kept telling Controller that 'we lost another one, 
cold PZ, when are we getting exfiltrated?'  Controller said to hold on.  
After asking him three times, PL expressed urgency at getting the team 
out of there. I continued to tell Controller but he just kept telling 
me to hold on. After the third time, I handed the hand mike to the PL 
and asked him to tell Controller the same thing. For the next thirteen 
hours, there were sporadic firefights from about 300 meters away. All 
of the close fighting was done because we had neutralized all close 
enemies. The mountaintop had three different peaks. We held the two 
highest ones. About 300 meters to our south, southeast was the third 
hilltop where the enemy was coming up. At one point Controller told me 
that the enemy was trying to reinforce with seventy guys. I was not 
clear if he was talking about seventy friendly or enemy. I then asked 
if the seventy guys coming up this way were not my friends.  He said 
'Roger.' I said I wanted to make sure that was clear. I tried to keep 
that between the PL and myself because it would have destroyed the 
other guys' morale. I think the PL let the team know so they could be 
ready. We never did see the seventy enemies. I put the PL on the radio 
and he was being told the exfiltration sequence of events. I was 
sitting next to him taking notes. Once the exfiltration plan was sorted 
out, we sat around and waited until the AC-130 checked in. We had them 
fly around and occasionally shooting. Controller said we had eight 
enemies moving in to our south. I never did run into them. CCT was 
talking to the AC-130 and I was talking to Controller. I gave Controller 
the approach heading, the land heading and the departure heading. There 
was a 090 approach heading, 235 land heading, and 270 departure heading.  
The first aircraft came in on a 090 and then came to a hover. I tried to 
get him on the radio to tell him to turn around and do a 180. I could not 
reach him so I called Controller and asked him to get in contact with the 
second and third helicopters to have them land at 180 degrees from what 
the first one did. It was important to have the second one land that way 
in order to upload the KIAs quickly. He was able to reach them and the 
second and third helicopters landed according to direction. Because the 
first one landed heading the wrong direction, the exfiltration was slowed 
down immensely. We had to drag the casualties all the way around the back 
of the helicopter and load them up. It was important that the second one
landed the way it did.  My entire unit got on the second helicopter
while another unit got off to pull security.  They then got on the
helicopter and left.  If they had landed the way the first one did, it
would have taken a lot longer than it did.  The entire exfiltration
process took too long, about 15 minutes for the first two helicopters. 
It was all quiet when we were being exfiltrated. It felt really good when 
I got back and my buddies said they were sitting around the radio 
listening. They were impressed that I never got emotional and was calm 
and professional the whole time. I tried to keep a monotone voice. 
There were times that I tried to throw some words in there to make 
Controller realize that we have to get out. It became a personal 
conversation and we kept saying we have to get out of here. I received 
a minor wound to my left shoulder. It is a shrapnel puncture wound. 
I didn't notice it until a day later when I woke up and my shoulder felt 
like someone punched me. I then looked at the T-shirt Iwas wearing that 
night and noticed it was blood stained. I went through so many different 
emotions, excited, mad, frustrated, sad, any other emotion you could 
possibly feel, you feel going through this whole thing. And I felt guilty 
if I felt anything was funny like the Sgt's helmet with the holes in it 
because we had lost members of our team. Everyone out there just did his 
job. I just did my job, everything came natural and my training kicked in.  
There is nothing I could have changed about that day. Nothing we could 
have done different or better. I could not ask for a better group of guys 
to work with. I have trained for eight years to do this and now I had the 
chance to get to do my job -- that is reward enough. Everybody working 
together and the good Lord is what got us home.








 






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